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Book Review 
Jean-François Lyotard, Pourquoi Philosopher? (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2012), pp.112 
(paperback).  
Pourquoi Philosopher? collects Jean-François Lyotard’s previously 
unpublished four-part introductory course in philosophy, delivered to 
students of the Sorbonne in 1964. The publication of this “new” work by 
Lyotard is both cause for celebration, and a sign that the late philosopher’s 
fortunes are changing. Relegated as he was to a minor footnote of late 
twentieth century continental philosophy during the first decade of the 
twenty-first, something of a Lyotard renaissance is now underway on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Several factors could account for this (among them, 
perhaps, the much more popular Alain Badiou’s insistence that Lyotard be 
read as one of his major interlocutors); in any case, scholars are rightly 
discovering much more to Lyotard than tired debates about postmodernism, 
and publications by and about the philosopher are steadily increasing. 
Against this background, Pourquoi Philosopher? takes on a double 
significance: historical and, to the extent that it treats of one of the most basic 
of all philosophical questions – why philosophize? – meta-philosophical.  
The historical value of the text will be readily appreciated by anyone 
with a basic familiarity with Lyotard’s corpus and intellectual trajectory 
(Corinne Enaudau’s concise introduction, though hitting on all of the 
essentials, assumes more than a passing familiarity and from this 
perspective leaves something to be desired). It will be recognized among 
Lyotard scholars that the introductory course marks an important period: 
having devoted himself for about a decade to the cause of socialist 
revolution in France and Algeria with post-Trotskyite militant group and 
journal Socialisme ou barbarie, Lyotard would around this time begin to drift 
from Marxism towards a radical Freudian “accelerationist” philosophy of 
capitalism. Socialisme ou barbarie itself splintered during this period under 
the weight of objective disappointments and a series of divisive and 
decidedly non-Marxist theses advanced by Cornelius Castoriadis. Lyotard, 
though highly sympathetic to Castoriadis’s own trajectory, would limp on 
instead under splinter group Pouvoir ouvrier for two more years. In reading 
the 1964 course in philosophy, however, it is already apparent that Lyotard’s 
Marxism is deeply and perhaps irreparably troubled; Freud (via Lacan) vies 
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with Marx to be the course’s philosophical touchstone. And though he 
devotes an entire lecture to the topic of philosophy and action vis-à-vis 
Marx’s famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, something of the later 
Lyotard’s political melancholia also comes to the fore.  
In fact, historically-minded readers will find much in the lectures 
anticipating the later Lyotard’s better-known concepts and positions, 
especially and, surprisingly perhaps, as regards the language-based 
antihumanism that Lyotard would famously sketch in Just Gaming and The 
Postmodern Condition before working it out rigorously in The Differend. From 
an archeological perspective (so to speak) it is highly gratifying to find strata 
of well-considered linguistic antihumanism in the lectures, especially since it 
is widely thought that Lyotard’s linguistic turn occurred after and in 
response to the aforementioned accelerationist philosophy that would 
increasingly dominate his thought from the late 60s to the mid-70s. Here we 
find Lyotard considering meta-philosophical questions from various 
interdisciplinary perspectives, with the eclectic spirit he would maintain for 
the rest of his life; in this light, the linguistic turn appears to be more 
properly a return to themes and arguments sketched at the very moment of 
Lyotard’s drift from Marxism.        
Historical aspect aside, the meta-philosophical questions raised in the 
text should be engaging to even the most casual or novice reader of Lyotard. 
The course is broken into four lectures, each of which treats a different 
aspect or way into its animating question:  
-­‐ Pourquoi désirer? Lyotard considers the question “why 
philosophize?” in light of the question “why desire?” The move is 
both rhetorical, and philosophically substantive. It is rhetorical 
because if to philosophize is in some way to desire, then asking 
“why philosophize?” is as silly as asking “why desire?” It is 
philosophically substantive because placing philosophy in the 
register of desire – specifically, Freud’s pulsional theory as 
sketched in Beyond the Pleasure Principle – is highly contentious. It is 
also par excellence an antihumanist and anti-rationalist kind of 
move, anticipating Lyotard’s later, worked-out libidinal 
antihumanism (anti-Cartesian, anti-Sartrian; it is not the subject 
who desires/philosophizes, it is simply the case that “ça désire,” 
that “it” does; in a manner of speaking, that desire desires). 
Philosophy, by nature reflexive, would then be a case of desire 
desiring itself; this anticipates the better known, postmodern 
Lyotard’s stance that philosophy is a discourse constitutively and 
perpetually in search of its own rules.  
-­‐ Philosophie et origine. Lyotard denies philosophy an origin, in a 
double sense. First, contra the young Hegel, he denies that 
philosophy can be successfully deployed to retrieve a lost unity (by 
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its very nature, in fact, philosophy exposes the idea of unity as 
specious). Second, he denies the historical claim that philosophy 
originates in a particular time and place, for instance, with the pre-
Socratics. If to philosophize is to desire, and if desire constitutively 
eludes completion, then philosophy is timeless; it is older than its 
emergence in writing in ancient Greece, and it will never be 
finished. Here again, a range of future questions and themes in 
Lyotard’s corpus is anticipated.  
-­‐ Sur la parole philosophique. As previously mentioned, to my mind the 
lecture on language is in a sense the most surprising and therefore 
the most interesting of the four. Lyotard criticizes the 
communicational ideology of language as an inert material by 
which to convey messages, locating the supposed subject-who-
speaks in the mesh of a language which always already precedes 
her. All of the substance of the postmodern and late Lyotard is here 
in embryonic form. Again, antihumanism predominates.     
-­‐ Sur philosophie et action. Lyotard considers philosophy in light of 
Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, according to which 
“Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point is to change it.” Not surprisingly, he sketches a 
Marx who looks much more like Lyotard than Marx; to change the 
world, to act within it, requires an active listening, a certain 
openness to what the world struggles to say but cannot (once again, 
major future themes – the differend, “passibility” to the event, etc. – 
come to the fore). This openness being the purview of philosophy, 
Marxism becomes a critical theory (a critical theoretical practice?) of 
society (rather than a totalizing, Hegelian or evolutionary 
explanatory framework) for which philosophy is essential. The 
aforementioned questions of desire and of philosophical discourse 
set the agenda. Marx is, in effect, still a major reference; but he is on 
his way to the nigh-unrecognizable Marx of the postmodern and 
late Lyotard.     
However one judges Lyotard’s philosophy of philosophy in these 
lectures, they put their finger on the pulse of some of the major themes 
animating French philosophy of the time. Trying to hit upon a radical 
Leftism critical of the Soviet bureaucratic perversion of Marxism, but also 
immune to the comparatively abstract, humanistic moralising of much post-
1956 European Leftism (cf. Sartre and those in his ballpark), Lyotard and 
others would turn to a Lacan-ized Freud and other antihumanistic resources 
– not necessarily towards a “Freudo-Marxist” synthesis, but certainly to find 
a way out of the impasse. In the bargain, philosophy inevitably takes a back 
seat – at worst figuring as a system-building, ideological mystification, and 
at best, as a perennially useful critical weapon, a basic intellectual “style,” or 
an inescapable desire named by critical theoretical practice. Lyotard, in the 
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lectures and throughout his career, accords philosophy a terribly humble 
place relative to the grand pretensions of its history – but for all that, 
defends it tenaciously. In the end he points out, quite correctly, that a 
legitimate answer to the question “why philosophize?” is simply “how not 
philosophize?” 
In sum, Pourquoi Philosopher? will be of considerable interest to Lyotard 
scholars; but it is also well-placed to capture the imaginations of 
philosophers more generally. In a climate of economic austerity and general 
contraction in the humanities, the question “why philosophize?” – perennial 
though it is – bears a topical relevance bridging the major philosophical 
traditions and calling more than ever for sustained and, where possible, 
collective reflection.          
Matthew R. McLennan 
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